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An evidence-based account of trust is essential for an appropriate treatment of application-level
interactions among autonomous and adaptive parties. Key examples include social networks and
service-oriented computing. Existing approaches either ignore evidence or only partially address
the twin challenges of mapping evidence to trustworthiness and combining trust reports from
imperfectly trusted sources. This paper develops a mathematically well-formulated approach that
naturally supports discounting and combining evidence-based trust reports.
This paper understands an agent Alice’s trust in an agent Bob in terms of Alice’s certainty in
her belief that Bob is trustworthy. Unlike previous approaches, this paper formulates certainty
in terms of evidence based on a statistical measure deﬁned over a probability distribution of the
probability of positive outcomes. This deﬁnition supports important mathematical properties
ensuring correct results despite conﬂicting evidence: (1) for a ﬁxed amount of evidence, certainty
increases as conﬂict in the evidence decreases and (2) for a ﬁxed level of conﬂict, certainty increases
as the amount of evidence increases. Moreover, despite a subtle deﬁnition of certainty, this paper
(3) establishes a bijection between evidence and trust spaces, enabling robust combination of trust
reports and (4) provides an eﬃcient algorithm for computing this bijection.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence—Multia-
gent systems
General Terms: Theory, Algorithms
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Application-level trust, evidence-based trust
1. INTRODUCTION
Trust is a broad concept with many connotations. This paper concentrates on trust as
it relates to beliefs about future actions and not, for example, to emotions. Our target
applications involve settings wherein independent (i.e., autonomous and adaptive) parties
interact with one another, and each party may choose with whom to interact based on how
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much trust it places in the other. Examples of such applications are social networks, webs
of information sources, and online marketplaces. We can cast each party as providing and
seeking services, and the problem as one of service selection in a distributed environment.
1.1 What is Trust?
A key intuition about trust as it is applied in the above kinds of settings is that reﬂects
the trusting party’s belief that the trusted party will support its plans [Castelfranchi et al.
2006]. For example, if Alice trusts Bob to get her to the airport, then this means that Alice
is putting part of her plans in Bob’s hands. In other words, Alice believes that there will
be a good outcome from Bob providing her with the speciﬁc service. In a social setting,
a similar question would be whether Alice trusts Bob to give her a recommendation to a
movie that she will enjoy watching or whether Alice trusts Bob to introduce her to a new
friend, Charlie, with whom she will have pleasant interactions. In scientiﬁc computing on
the cloud,Alice may trust a serviceprovidersuchas Amazonthat she will receiveadequate
compute resources for her analysis tool to complete on schedule.
Trust makes sense as a coherent concept for computing only to the extent that we con-
ﬁne ourselves to settings where it would affect the decisions made by one or more partic-
ipants. Speciﬁcally, this places two constraints. One, the participants ought to have the
possibility of predicting each other’s future behavior. For example, if all interactions were
random (in the sense of a uniform distribution), no beneﬁt would accrue to any participant
who attempts to model the trustworthiness of another. Two, if the setting ensured per-
fect anonymity for all concerned, trust would not be a useful concept because none of the
participants would be able to apply trust.
Except in settings where we have full access to how all the participants involvedare rea-
soning and where we can apply strict constraints on their reasoning and their capabilities,
we cannot make any guarantees of success. More importantly, in complex settings, the
circumstances can change drastically in unanticipated ways. When that happens, all bets
are off. Even the most trustworthy and predictable party may fail—our placement of trust
in such a party may not appear wise in retrospect. Taleb [2007] highlights unanticipated
situations and shows the difﬁculties such situations have caused for humans. We do not
claim that a computational approach would fare any better than humans in such situations.
However,computationalapproachescan providebetter bookkeepingthanhumans andthus
facilitate the applications of trust in domains of interest.
1.2 Applications: Online Markets and Social Networks
Ofthemanycomputerscienceapplicationsoftrust, ourapproachemphasizestwoinpartic-
ular. These applications, online markets and social networks, are among the most popular
practical applications of large-scale distributed computing (involving tens of millions of
users) and involve trust as a key feature.
Online markets provide a setting where people and businesses buy and sell goods and
services. Companies such as eBay and Amazon host markets where buyers and sellers
can register to obtain accounts. Such online markets host a facility where sellers can post
their items for sale and buyers can ﬁnd them. The markets provide a means to determine
the price for the item—by direct announcement or via an auction. However, in general,
key aspects of an item being traded are imperfectly speciﬁed, such as the condition of a
used book. Thus commerce relies upon the parties trusting each other. Because an online
market cannot readily ensure that buyer and seller accounts reﬂect real-world identities,
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eachpartyneedsto buildupits reputation(basedonwhichotherswouldﬁndit trustworthy)
throughinteractionsinthemarketitself: traditionalwaystoprojecttrust,suchasthequality
of a storefront or one’s attire, are not applicable. And trust is based to a large extent
on the positive and negative experiences obtained by others. Marketplaces such as eBay
and Amazon provide a means by which each participant in an interaction can rate the
other participant. The marketplace aggregates the ratings received by each participant to
compute the participant’s reputation, and publishes the reputation for others to see. The
idea is that a participant’s reputation would predict the behavior one would expect from it.
Current approachescarry out a simplistic aggregation. As Section 4.5 shows, our proposed
approachequals or exceeds current approachesin terms of predictingsubsequent behavior.
Social networks provide another signiﬁcant application area for trust. Existing social
network approaches, such as Facebook or LinkedIn, provide a logically centralized notion
of identity. Users then interact with others, potentially listing them as friends (or profes-
sional contacts). Users may also state opinions about others. The above approaches treat
friendship as a symmetric relationship. They enable users to introduce their friends as a
way to expand the friends’ social circles and help with tasks such as looking for a job or
a contract. The idea is that trust can propagate, and can provide a valid basis for inter-
action between parties who were not previously directly acquainted with each other. The
existing popular approaches do not compute the propagated trust explicitly, although the
situation could change. Several have observed the intuitive similarity of social networks
and the web, and developed trust propagation techniques (several of which we review in
Section 5.1). In terms of modeling, when we think of real-life social networks, we ﬁnd it
more natural to think of friendship and trust as potentially asymmetric. Alice may admire
Bob but Bob may not admire Alice. This in addition maintains a stronger analogy with the
web: Alice’s home page may point to Bob’s but not the other way around. For this reason,
we think of a social network as a weighted directed graph. Each vertex of the graph is a
person, each edge means that its source is acquainted with its target, and the weight on an
edge represents the level of trust placed by the source in the target. Symmetric situations
can be readily capturedby having two equally weightededges, the source and targetof one
being the target and source of the other.
The directed graph representation is commonly used for several approaches including
the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) web of trust [Zimmermann 1995; WoT 2009] and the
FilmTrust [Kuter and Golbeck 2007] network for movie ratings. The PGP web of trust
is based on the keyrings of different users—or, rather, of different identities. The idea is
that each key owner may apply his key to certify zero or more other keys. The certifying
key owner expresses his level of trust as an integer from 1 to 4. The intended use of the
web of trust is to help a user Alice verify that a key she encounters is legitimate: if the key
is signed by several keys that Alice trusts then it presumably is trustworthy. FilmTrust is a
social network where users rate other users on the presumed quality of their movie ratings.
An intended use of FilmTrust is to help a user Alice ﬁnd users whose movie recommen-
dations Alice would ﬁnd trustworthy. Both these networks rely upon the propagation of
trust.
Although the trust propagation is not the theme of this paper, it is a major motivation
for the approachhere. In intuitive terms, propagationrelies upon an ability to discount and
aggregate trust reports. What this paper offers are the underpinnings of approaches that
propagatetrust based on evidence. Hang et al. [2009] and Wang and Singh [2006] propose
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propagation operators that are based on the approach described in this paper. Importantly,
Hang et al. evaluate these operators on existing PGP web of trust and FilmTrust datasets.
As Section 4.5 shows, Hang et al. ﬁnd that operators based on our approach yield superior
predictions of propagated trust than some conventional approaches.
1.3 Modeling Trust
Let us brieﬂy consider the pros and cons of the existing approaches in broad terms. (Sec-
tion 5 discusses the relevant literature in some detail.) Trust as an object of intellectual
study has drawn attention from a variety of disciplines. We think of four main ways to
approach trust. The logical approaches develop models based on mathematical logic that
describe how one party trusts another. The cognitive approaches develop models that seek
to achieverealism in the sense of humanpsychology. The socioeconomicapproacheschar-
acterize trust in terms of the personal or business relationships among the parties involved,
taking inspiration from humanrelationships. The statistical approachesunderstandtrust in
terms of probabilistic and statistical measures.
Eachfamilyofapproachesoffersadvantagesfordifferentcomputerscienceapplications.
The logical approaches are nicely suited to the challenges of specifying policies such as
for determining identity and authorization. The cognitive approaches describe the human
experience and would yield natural beneﬁts where human interfaces are involved. The
socioeconomic approaches apply in settings such as electronic commerce. The statistical
approaches work best where the account of trust is naturally based on evidence, which
can be used to assess the trust one party places in another. The approach we propose falls
in the intersection of statistical and socioeconomic approaches, with an emphasis on the
treatment of evidence in a way that can be discounted and aggregated as some socioeco-
nomic approaches require. This approach relies upon logical approaches for identity and
providean input into decision-makingabout authorization. It should be clear that we make
no claims about the purely cognitive aspects of trust.
The currently dominant computer science approaches for trust emphasize identity. A
party attempts to establish its trustworthiness to another party by presenting a certiﬁcate.
The certiﬁcate is typically obtainedfroma certiﬁcate authorityor (as in webs of trust) from
another party. The presumption is that the certiﬁcate issuer would have performed some
ofﬂine veriﬁcation. The best case is that a party truly has the identity that it professes to
have. Although establishing identity is crucial to enabling trust, identity by itself is inad-
equate for the problems we discuss here. In particular, identity does not yield a basis for
determining if a given party will serve a desired purpose appropriately. For example, if
Amazon presents a valid certiﬁcate obtained from Verisign, the most it means is that the
presenter of the certiﬁcate is indeed Amazon. The certiﬁcate does not mean that Alice
would have a pleasant shopping experience at Amazon. After all, Verisign’s certiﬁcate
is not based upon any relevant experience: simply put, the certiﬁcate does not mean that
Verisign purchased goods from Amazon and had a pleasant experience. From the tradi-
tional standpoint, this example might sound outlandish, but ultimately if trust is to mean
that one party can place its plans in the hands of another, the expected experienceis no less
relevant than the identity of the provider.
Traditional approaches model trust qualitatively, based on an intuition of hard security.
If one cannot deﬁnitely determine that a particular party has the stated identity, then that
is sufﬁcient reason not to deal with it at all. Yet, in many cases, requiring an all-or-none
decision about trust can be too much to ask for, especially when we think not of identity
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but more broadly of whether a given party would support one’s plans. When we factor in
the complexity of the real world and the task to be performed, virtually no one would be
able to make a hard guarantee about success. Following the above example, it would be
impossible for Bob to guarantee that he will get Alice to the airport on time, recommend
only the perfect movies, or introduce her to none other than her potential soul mate.
Approaches based on reputation management seek to address this challenge. They usu-
ally accommodate shades of trust numerically based on ratings acquired from users. How-
ever, these approaches are typically formulated in a heuristic, somewhat ad hoc manner.
The meaning assigned to the aggregated ratings is not clear from a probabilistic (or any
other mathematical) standpoint. For the reasons adduced above, although the traditional
approaches to trust are valuable, they are not adequate for dealing with the kinds of in-
teractive applications that arise in settings such as social networks and service-oriented
computing. This paper develops a mathematical approach that addresses such challenges.
1.4 Trust Management
Trust management[Ioannidis and Keromytis 2005] refers to the approaches by which trust
judgments are reached, including how trust information is maintained, propagated, and
used. The trust model being considered is signiﬁcant. The logic-based approaches lead to
trust management approaches centered on the maintenance, propagation, and use of iden-
tity credentials expressed as values of attributes needed to make authorization decisions
based on stated policies. Other elements of trust management involve architectural as-
sumptions such as the existence of certiﬁcate authorities and the creation and evaluation of
certiﬁcate chains. To our knowledge, trust management has not been explicitly addressed
for the cognitive approaches.
The socioeconomic approaches are a leading alternative. In the case of marketplaces
and social networking web-sites, such approaches postulate the existence of an authority
that provides the identity for each participant. In some cases, an “enforcer” can remove
participants that misbehave and can attempt to litigate against them in the real world, but
the connection between a virtual identity and a real-world identity is tenuous in general.
Other networks, such as the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) web of trust, postulate no central
authority at all, and rely on direct relationships between pairs of participants. Most re-
cent research in socioeconomic approaches takes a conceptually distributed stance, which
is well-aligned with multiagent systems. Here the participants are modeled as peers who
continuallyinteractwithandrate eachother. Thepeersexchangetheirratingsofothersas a
way to helpeachotheridentifythe best peerswith whomto interact. Where theapproaches
differ is in how they represent trust, how they exchange trust reports, and how they aggre-
gate trust reports. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 review the most relevant of these approaches.
1.5 Scope and Organization
This paper develops a probabilistic account of trust that considers the interactions among
parties is crucial for supporting the above kinds of applications. Section 2 motivates an
evidential treatment of trust. Section 3 proposes a new notion of certainty in evidence
by which we can map evidence into trust effectively. Section 4 shows that this approach
satisﬁes some important properties, and shows how to apply it computationally. Section 5
reviews some of the most relevant literature. Section 6 summarizes our contributions and
brings forth some directions for future work.
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2. MOTIVATING EVIDENCE-BASED TRUST
Subtle relationships underlie trust in social and organizationalsettings [Castelfranchi et al.
2006]. We take take a narrower view of trust and focus on its probabilistic aspects. We
modeleach partycomputationallyas an agent. Each agentseeks to establish a belief ordis-
belief that another agent’s behavior is good (thus abstracting out details of the agent’s own
plans as well as the social and organizational relationships between the two agents). The
model we propose here, however, can in principle be used to capture as many dimensions
of trust as needed, e.g., trust about timeliness, quality of service, and so on.
In broadterms, trust arises in two main settings studied in economics[Dellarocas 2005].
In the ﬁrst, the agents adjust their behavior according to their payoffs. The corresponding
approaches to trust seek to alter the payoffs by sanctioning bad agents so that all agents
have an incentive to be good. In the second setting, which this paper considers, the agents
are of (more or less) ﬁxed types, meaning that they do not adjust whether their behavior
is good or bad. The corresponding approaches to trust seek to distinguish good agents
from bad agents, i.e., signal who the bad (or good) agents are. Of course, the payoffs of
the agents would vary depending on whether other agents trust them or not. Thus, even
in the second setting, agents may adjust their behavior. However, such incentive-driven
adjustments would occur at a slower time scale.
The following are some examples of the signaling setting, which we study. An airline
would treat all coach passengers alike. Its effectiveness in transporting passengers and
caring for them in transit depends on its investments in aircraft, airport lounges, and staff
training. Such investments can change the airline’s trustworthiness for a passenger, but
a typical passenger would do well to treat the airline’s behavior as being relatively sta-
ble. In the same vein, a computational service provider’s performance would depend on
its investments in computing, storage, and networking infrastructure; a weather service’s
accuracy and timeliness on the quality of its available infrastructure (sensors, networks,
and prediction tools). Our approach does not inherently require that the agents’ behavior
be ﬁxed. Common heuristic approaches for decaying trust values can be combined with
our work. However, accommodating trust updates in a mathematically well-formulated
manner is itself a challenging problem, and one we defer to future work.
Our approach contrasts starkly with the most prevalent trust models (reviewed in Sec-
tion 5.1), wherein ratings reﬂect nothing more than subjective user assessments without
regard to evidence. We understand an agent placing trust in another party based substan-
tially on evidence consisting of positive and negative experiences with it. This evidence
can be collected by an agent locally or via a reputation agency [Maximilien and Singh
2004] or by following a referral protocol [Sen and Sajja 2002]. In such cases, the evi-
dence may be implicit: the trust reports, in essence, summarize the evidence being shared.
This paper develops a mathematically well-formulated evidence-based approach for trust
that supports the following two crucial requirements, which arise in multiagent systems
applied in important settings such as electronic commerce or information fusion.
Dynamism. Practical agent systems face the challenge that trust evolves over time. This
may happen because additional information is obtained, the parties being considered
alter their behavior, or the needs of the rating party change.
Composition. It is clear that trust cannot be trivially propagated. For example, Alice may
trust Bob who trusts Charlie, but Alice may not trust Charlie. However, as a practical
matter, a party would not have the opportunity or be able to expend the cost, e.g., in
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money or time, to obtain direct experiences with every other party. This is the reason
that a multiagent approach—wherein agents exchange trust reports—is plausible. Con-
sequently, we need a way to combine trust reports that cannot themselves be perfectly
trusted, possibly because of the source of such reports or the way in which such reports
are obtained. And, we do need to accommodate the requirement that trust is weakened
when propagated through such chains.
Traditionally, mathematically well-formulated approaches to trust that satisfy the above
requirements have been difﬁcult to come by. With few exceptions, current approaches
for combining trust reports tend to involve ad hoc formulas, which might be simple to
implement but are difﬁcult to understand and justify from a conceptual basis.
The commonidea underlyingsolutions that satisfy the aboverequirementsof dynamism
and composition is the notion of discounting. Dynamism can be accommodated by dis-
countingover time and composition by discountingover the space of sources (i.e., agents).
Others have applied discounting before, but without adequate mathematical justiﬁcation.
For instance, Yu and Singh [2002] develop a heuristic discounting approach layered on
their (otherwise mathematically well-formulated) Dempster-Shafer account.
Wang and Singh [2006] describe a multiagent application of the present approach. They
developanalgebraforaggregatingtrust overgraphsunderstoodas webs oftrust. Wang and
Singh concentrate on their algebra and assume a separate, underlying trust model, which
is a previous version of the one developed here. By contrast, the present paper is neutral
aboutthe discountingandaggregationmechanisms, and instead developsa mathematically
well-formulated evidential trust model that would underlie any such agent system where
trust reports are gathered from multiple sources.
FollowingJøsang[2001],we understandtrust in terms of the probabilityof the probabil-
ity of outcomes, and adopt his idea of a trust space of triples of belief (in a good outcome),
disbelief (or belief in a bad outcome), and uncertainty. Trust in this sense is neutral as
to the outcome and is reﬂected in the certainty (i.e., one minus the uncertainty). Thus the
following three situations are distinguished:
—Trust being placed in a party (i.e., regarding the party as being good): belief is high,
disbelief is low, and uncertainty is low.
—Distrust being placed in a party (i.e., regarding the party as being bad): belief is low,
disbelief is high, and uncertainty is low.
—Lack of trust being placed in a party (pro or con): belief is low, disbelief is low, and
uncertainty is high.
However, whereas Jøsang deﬁnes certainty itself in a heuristic manner, we deﬁne cer-
tainty based on a well-known statistical measure over a probability distribution. Despite
the increased subtlety of our deﬁnition, it preserves a bijection between trust and evidence
spaces, enabling the combination of trust reports (via mapping them to evidence). Our
deﬁnition captures the following key intuitions.
—Effect of evidence. Certainty increases as evidence increases (fora ﬁxed ratio of positive
and negative observations). Jøsang’s approach also satisﬁes this criterion.
—Effect of conﬂict. Certainty decreases as the extent of conﬂict increases in the evidence.
Jøsang’s approach fails this criterion: whether evidence is unanimous or highly conﬂict-
ing has no effect on its predictions.
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Yu and Singh [2002] model positive, negative, or neutral evidence, and apply Dempster-
Shafer theory to compute trust. Neutral experiences yield uncertainty, but conﬂicting pos-
itive or negative evidence does not increase uncertainty. Further, for conﬂicting evidence,
Dempster-Shafer theory can yield unintuitive results. The following is a well-known ex-
ample about the Dempster-Shafer theory, and is not speciﬁc to Yu and Singh’s use of it
[Sentz and Ferson 2002; Zadeh 1979]. Say Pete sees two physicians, Dawn and Ed, for
a headache. Dawn says Pete has meningitis, a brain tumor, or neither—with probabil-
ities 0.79, 0.20, and 0.01, respectively. Ed says Pete has a concussion, a brain tumor,
or neither—with probabilities 0.79, 0.20, and 0.01, respectively. Dempster-Shafer theory
yields that the probability of a brain tumor is 0.725, which is highly counterintuitive and
wrong, because neither Dawn nor Ed thought that a brain tumor was likely. Section 4.3
shows that our model of trust yields an intuitive result in this case: the probability of a
brain tumor is 0.21, which is close to each individual physician’s beliefs.
To help scope our contribution, we observe that we study a rigorous probabilistic rep-
resentation of trust that captures beliefs regarding the success of a prospective interaction
between a trusting and a trusted party. Thus our approachis suitable in a wide range of set-
tings where autonomousparties interact. The propagationof trust is a major application of
this work, but is not the topic of study here. This paper makes the following contributions.
—A rigorous, probabilistic deﬁnition of certainty that satisﬁes the above key intuitions,
especially with regard to accommodating conﬂicting information.
—The establishment of a bijection between trust reports and evidence, which enables the
mathematically well-formulated combination of trust reports that supports discounting
as motivated above.
—An efﬁcient algorithm for computing the above-mentionedbijection.
3. MODELING CERTAINTY
The proposed approach is based on the fundamental intuition that an agent can model
the behavior of another agent in probabilistic terms. Speciﬁcally, an agent can represent
the probability of a positive experience with, i.e., good behavior by, another agent. This
probabilitymust lie in the real interval [0,1]. The agent’s trust correspondsto how strongly
the agent believes that this probability is a speciﬁc value (whether large or small, we do
not care). This strength of belief is also captured in probabilistic terms. To this end,
we formulate a probability density function of the probability of a positive experience.
Following [Jøsang 1998], we term this a probability-certainty density function (PCDF).
Crucially, in our approach, unlike in Jøsang’s, certainty is a statistical measure deﬁned on
a PCDF, and thus naturally accommodates both the amount of evidence and the extent of
the conﬂict in the evidence.
3.1 Certainty from a PCDF
Because the cumulativeprobabilityofa probabilitylying within[0,1] equals1, eachPCDF
has the mean density of 1 over [0,1], and 0 elsewhere. Lacking additional knowledge, a
PCDF would be a uniform distribution over [0,1]. However, with additional knowledge,
the PCDF deviates from the uniform distribution. For example, knowing that the probabil-
ity of goodbehavioris at least 0.5, we would obtaina distribution that is 0 over[0,0.5) and
2 over [0.5,1]. Similarly, knowing that the probability of good behavior lies in [0.5,0.6],
we would obtain a distribution that is 0 over [0,0.5) and (0.6,1], and 10 over [0.5,0.6].
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Let p ∈ [0,1] represent the probability of a positive outcome. Let the distribution of p
be given as a function f : [0,1]  → [0,∞) such that
  1
0 f(p)dp = 1. The probability that
the probability of a positive outcome lies in [p1,p2] can be calculated by
  p2
p1 f(p)dp. The
mean value of f is
  1
0 f(p)dp
1−0 = 1. As explained above, when we know nothing else, f is a
uniform distribution over probabilities p. That is, f(p) = 1 for p ∈ [0,1] and 0 elsewhere.
This reﬂects the Bayesian intuition of assuming an equiprobable prior. The uniform dis-
tribution has a certainty of 0. As additional knowledge is acquired, the probability mass
shifts so that f(p) is above 1 for some values of p and below 1 for other values of p.
Our key intuition is that the agent’s trust corresponds to increasing deviation from the
uniform distribution. Two of the most established measures for deviation are standard
deviation and mean absolute deviation (MAD) [Weisstein 2003]. MAD is more robust,
because it does not involve squaring (which can increase standard deviation because of
outliers or “heavy tail” distributions such as the Cauchy distribution). Absolute values
can sometimes complicate the mathematics. But, in the present setting, MAD turns out
to yield straightforward mathematics. In a discrete setting involving data points x1 ...xn
with mean ˆ x, MAD is given by 1
nΣn
i=1|xi − ˆ x|. In the present case, instead of summation
we have an integral, so instead of dividing by n we divide by the size of the domain, i.e.,
1. Because a PCDF has a mean value of 1, increase in some parts above 1 must yield a
matching reduction below 1 elsewhere. Both increase and reduction from 1 are counted by
|f(p)−1|. Deﬁnition 1 scales the MAD for f by 1
2 to remove this double counting; it also
conveniently places certainty in the interval [0,1].
DEFINITION 1. The certainty based on f, cf, is given by cf = 1
2
  1
0 |f(p) − 1|dp
In informal terms, certainty captures the fraction of the knowledge that we do have.
(Section 5.3 compares this approach to information theory.) For motivation, consider ran-
domly picking a ball from a bin that contains N balls colored white or black. Suppose p is
the probability that the ball randomly picked is white. If we have no knowledge about how
many white balls there are in the bin, we cannot estimate p with any conﬁdence. That is,
certaintyc = 0. If we knowthat exactlym balls arewhite, thenwe have perfectknowledge
about the distribution. We can estimate p = m
N with c = 1. However, if all we know is that
at least m balls are white and at least n balls are black (thus m + n ≤ N), then we have
partial knowledge. Here c = m+n
N . The probability of drawing a white ball ranges from
m
N to 1 − n
N. We have f(p) = N
N−m−n when p ∈ [m
N,1 − n
N] and f(p) = 0 elsewhere.
Using Deﬁnition 1, we can conﬁrm that certainty based on f equals cf = m+n
N .
3.2 Evidence Space
For simplicity, we begin by thinkingof a (rating) agent’s experiencewith a (rated) agent as
a binary event: positive or negative. Evidence is conceptualizedin terms of the numbers of
positive and negative experiences. When an agent makes unambiguousdirect observations
of another, the corresponding evidence could be expressed as natural numbers (including
zero). However, our motivation is to combine evidence in the context of trust. As Sec-
tion 1 motivates, for reasons of dynamism or composition, the evidence may need to be
discountedto reﬂect the weakeningof the evidencesource due to the effects of agingor the
effects of imperfect trust having been placed in it. Intuitively,because of such discounting,
the evidence is best understood as if there were real (i.e., not necessarily natural) numbers
of experiences. Similarly, when a rating agent’s observations are not clearcut positive or
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negative,we can capturetheratings viaarbitrarynonnegativereal numbers(as longas their
sum is positive). Accordingly, following [Jøsang 2001], we model the evidence space as
E = R+ × R+ \ { 0,0 }, a two-dimensional space of nonnegative reals whose sum is
strictly positive. (Here R+ is the set of nonnegative reals.) The members of E are pairs
 r,s  corresponding to the numbers of positive and negative experiences, respectively.
DEFINITION 2. Evidence space E = { r,s |r ≥ 0,s ≥ 0,t = r + s > 0}
Combiningevidenceis trivial: simplyadd upthe positiveand negativeevidenceseparately.
Let x be the probability of a positive outcome. The posterior probability of evidence  r,s 
is the conditional probability of x given  r,s  [Casella and Berger 1990, p. 298].
DEFINITION 3. The conditional probability of x given  r,s  is f(x| r,s ) =
g( r,s |x)f(x)   1
0 g( r,s |x)f(x)dx =
x
r(1−x)
s
  1
0 xr(1−x)sdx, where g( r,s |x) = (
r+s
r )xr(1 − x)s.
Throughoutthis paper, r, s, and t = r +s refer to positive, negative, and total evidence,
respectively. The following development assumes that there is some evidence; i.e., t > 0.
Traditional probabilitytheory models the event  r,s  by the pair (p,1−p), the expected
probabilities of positive and negative outcomes, respectively, where p = r+1
r+s+2 = r+1
t+2.
The idea of adding 1 each to r and s (and thus 2 to r + s) follows Laplace’s famous rule
of succession for applying probability to inductive reasoning [Ristad 1995]. This rule in
essence reﬂects the assumption of an equiprobable prior, which is common in Bayesian
reasoning. Before any evidence, positive and negative outcomes are equally likely, and
this prior biases the evidence obtained subsequently.
Recallthatwemodeltotalevidenceasanonnegativerealnumberwhich,duetodiscount-
ing, can appear to be lower than 1. In such a case, the effect of any Laplace smoothing
can become dominant. For this reason, this paper differs from Wang and Singh [2007] in
deﬁning a measure of the conﬂict in the evidence that is different from the probability to
be inferred from the evidence.
3.3 Conﬂict in Evidence
The conﬂict in evidence simply refers to the relative weights of the negative and posi-
tive evidence. Conﬂict is highest when the negative and positive evidence are equal, and
least when the evidence is unanimous one way or the other. Deﬁnition 4 characterizes the
amount of conﬂict in the evidence. To this end, we deﬁne α as r
t. Clearly, α ∈ [0,1]: α
being 0 or 1 indicates unanimity, whereas α = 0.5 means r = s, i.e., maximal conﬂict in
the body of evidence. Deﬁnition 4 captures this intuition.
DEFINITION 4. conﬂict(r,s) = min(α,1 − α)
3.4 Certainty in Evidence
In our approach, as Deﬁnition 1 shows, certainty depends on the given PCDF. The partic-
ular PCDF we consider is the one of Deﬁnition 3, which generalizes over binary events. It
helps in our analysis to combine these so as to deﬁne certainty based on evidence  r,s ,
where r and s are the positive and negative bodies of evidence, respectively. Deﬁnition 5
merely writes certainty as a function of r and s.
DEFINITION 5. c(r,s) = 1
2
  1
0 |
(x
r(1−x)
s
  1
0 xr(1−x)sdx − 1|dx
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Recall that t = r + s is the total body of evidence. Thus r = tα and s = t(1 − α). We
can thus write c(r,s) as c(tα,t(1 − α)). When α is ﬁxed, certainty is a function of t, and
is written c(t). When t is ﬁxed, certainty is a function of α, and is written c(α). And, c′(t)
and c′(α) are the corresponding derivatives.
3.5 Trust Space
The traditional probability model outlined above ignores uncertainty. Thus it predicts the
same probability whenever r and s have the same ratio (correcting for the effect of the
Laplace smoothing) even thoughthe total amount of evidence may differ signiﬁcantly. For
example, we would obtain p = 0.70 whether r = 6 and s = 2 or r = 69 and s = 29.
However, the result would be intuitively much more certain in the second case because
of the overwhelming evidence: the good outcomes hold up even after a large number of
interactions. For this reason, we favor an approach that accommodates certainty.
Following [Jøsang 2001], we deﬁne a trust space as consisting of trust reports modeled
in a three-dimensional space of reals in [0,1]. Each point in this space is a triple  b,d,u ,
where b+d+u = 1, representingthe weights assignedto belief, disbelief, and uncertainty,
respectively. Certainty c is simply 1−u. Thus c = 1 and c = 0 indicate perfect knowledge
and ignorance, respectively. Deﬁnition 6 states this formally.
DEFINITION 6. Trust space T = { b,d,u |b,d ≥ 0,b+ d > 0,u > 0,b +d + u = 1}
Combining trust reports is nontrivial. Our proposed deﬁnition of certainty is key in
accomplishing a bijection between evidence and trust reports. The problem of combining
independent trust reports is reduced to the problem of combining the evidence underlying
them. Section 3.6 further explains how evidence and trust space are used in this approach.
3.6 From Evidence to Trust Reports
As remarkedabove, it is easier to aggregatetrust in the evidence space and to discount it in
trust space. As trust is propagated, each agent involved would map the evidence it obtains
to trust space, discount it, map it back to evidence space, and aggregate it as evidence. We
cannot accomplish the above merely by having the agents perform all their calculations in
either the evidencespace or the trust space. Therefore,we need a functionto map evidence
space to trust space. This function should be (uniquely) invertible.
Deﬁnition 7 shows how to map evidenceto trust. This mappingrelates positive and neg-
ative evidence to belief and disbelief, respectively, but with each having been discounted
by the certainty. Deﬁnition 7 generalizes the pattern of [Jøsang 1998] by identifying the
degree of conﬂict α and certainty c(r,s). The developmentbelow describes two important
differences with Jøsang’s approach.
DEFINITION 7. Let α = r
t and c(r,s) be as in Deﬁnition 5. Then Z(r,s) =  b,d,u 
is a transformation from E to T such that Z =  b(r,s),d(r,s),u(r,s) , where b(r,s) =
αc(r,s); d(r,s) = (1 − α)c(r,s); and u(r,s) = 1 − c(r,s).
Because t = r + s > 0, c(r,s) > 0. Moreover, c(r,s) < 1: thus, 1 − c(r,s) > 0. This
ensures that b + d > 0, and u > 0. Notice that α = b
b+d. Jøsang [1998] maps evidence
 r,s  to a trust triple ( r
t+1, s
t+1, 1
t+1). Our approach improves over Jøsang’s approach.
One, our deﬁnition of certainty depends not only on the amount of evidence but also on
the conﬂict, which Jøsang ignores. Two, our deﬁnition of certainty incorporates a subtle
characterization of the probabilities whereas, in essence, Jøsang deﬁnes certainty as t
t+1.
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He offers no mathematical justiﬁcation for doing so. The underlying intuition seems to be
that certainty increases with increasing evidence. We ﬁnesse this intuition to capture that
increasing evidence yields increasing certainty but only if the conﬂict does not increase.
Section 4.2 shows a counterintuitive consequence of Jøsang’s deﬁnition.
In passing, we observe that discounting as deﬁned by Jøsang [1998] and Wang and
Singh [2006] reduces the certainty but does not affect the probability of a good outcome.
Discounting in their manner involves multiplying the belief and disbelief components by
thesameconstant,γ  = 0. Thusatriple b,d,u is discountedbyγ toyield bγ,dγ,1−bγ−
dγ . Recall that the probability of a good outcome is given by α = b
b+d. The probability
of a good outcome from a discounted report is
bγ
bγ+dγ = b
b+d, which is the same as α.
Let us consider a simple example to illustrate how trust reports from different unreliable
sources are discounted and combined. Suppose Alice has eight good and two bad transac-
tions with a service provider, Charlie, yielding a trust triple of  0.42,0.1,0.48 . Suppose
Bob has one good and four bad transactions with the Charlie, yielding a trust triple of
 0.08,0.33,0.59 . Suppose Alice and Bob report their ratings of Charlie to Jon. Suppose
that Jon’s trust in Alice is  0.2,0.3,0.5  and his trust in Bob is  0.9,0.05,0.05 . Jon then
carries out the following steps.
—Jon discounts Alice’s report by the trust he places in Alice (i.e., the belief component of
his triple for Alice, 0.2), thus yielding  0.084,0.02,0.896 . Jon discounts Bob’s report
in the same way by 0.9, thereby yielding  0.072,0.297,0.631 .
—Jon transforms the above two discounted reports into the evidence space, thus obtaining
 0.429,0.107  from Alice’s report and  0.783,3.13  from Bob’s report.
—Jon combines these in evidence space, thus obtaining a total evidence of  1.212,3.237 .
—Transformingitintotrustspace,JoncalculateshistrustinCharlie:  0.097,0.256,0.645 .
Notice how, in the above, since Jon places much greater credibility in Bob than in Alice,
Jon’s overall assessment of Charlie is closer to Bob’s than to Alice’s.
4. IMPORTANT PROPERTIES AND COMPUTATION
We now discuss important formal properties of and an algorithm for the above deﬁnition.
4.1 Increasing Experiences with Fixed Conﬂict
Consider the scenario where the total number of experiences increases for ﬁxed α =
0.50. For example, compare observing 5 good episodes out of 10 with observing 50 good
episodes out of 100. The expected value, α, is the same in both cases, but the certainty
is clearly greater in the second. In general, we would expect certainty to increase as the
amount of evidence increases. Deﬁnition 5 yields a certainty of 0.46 from  r,s  =  5,5 ,
but a certainty of 0.70 for  r,s  =  50,50 .
Figure 1 plots how certainty varies with t both in our approach and in Jøsang’s ap-
proach. Notice that the speciﬁc numeric values of certainty in our approach should not be
compared to those in Jøsang’s approach. The trend is monotonic and asymptotic to 1 in
both approaches. The important observation is that our approach yields a higher certainty
curve when the conﬂict is lower. Theorem 1 captures this property in general.
THEOREM 1. Fix α. Then c(t) increases with t for t > 0.
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Fig. 1. Certainty increases with t both in Jøsang’s approach and in our approach when the level of conﬂict is
ﬁxed; for our approach, we show α = 0.5 and α = 0.99; in Jøsang’s approach, certainty is independent of the
level of conﬂict; X-axis: t, the amount of evidence; Y-axis: c(t), the corresponding certainty.
Proof sketch: The proof of this theorem is built via a series of steps. The main idea is to
show that c′(t) > 0 for t > 0. Here f(r,s,x) is the function of Deﬁnition 3 viewed as a
function of r, s, and x.
(1) Let f(r,s,x) =
(x
r(1−x)
s
  1
0 xr(1−x)sdx. Then c(r,s) = 1
2
  1
0 |f(r,s,x) − 1|dx. We can write
c and f as functions of t and α. That is, c = c(t,α) and f = f(t,α,x).
(2) Eliminate the absolute sign. By Lemma 9, we can deﬁne A and B where f(A) =
f(B) = 1 so that c(t,α) = 1
2
  1
0 |f(t,α,x) − 1|dx =
  B
A (f(t,α,x) − 1)dx A and B
are also functions of t and α.
(3) When α is ﬁxed, c(t,α) is a function of t and we can differentiate it by t. Notice that:
d
dt
  B(t)
A(t) (f(t,x)−1)dx = B′(t)(f(t,B)−1)−A′(t)(f(t,A)−1)+
  B(t)
A(t) ( ∂
∂tf(t,x)−
1)dx. The ﬁrst two terms are 0 by the deﬁnition of A and B.
(4) Using the formula, d
dxaf(x) = lnaf′(x)af(x) we can calculate ∂
∂tf(t,α,x).
(5) Thenwe break the result into two parts. Provethe ﬁrst part to be positiveby Lemma 9,
and the second part to be 0 by exploiting the symmetry of the terms.
Hence, c′(t) > 0 for t > 0, as desired.
The appendix includes full proofs of this and our other theorems.
4.2 Increasing Conﬂict with Fixed Experience
Another important scenario is when the total number of experiences is ﬁxed, but the evi-
dence varies to reﬂect different levels of conﬂict by using different values of α. Clearly,
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certaintyshouldincreaseas r ors dominatesthe other(i.e.,α approaches0or1) butshould
reduce as r and s are in balance (i.e., α approaches 0.5). Figure 2 plots certainty for ﬁxed
t and varying conﬂict.
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Fig. 2. Certainty is concave when t is ﬁxed at 100; X-axis: r + 1; Y-axis: c(α); minimum occurs at r = s = 5;
certainty according to Jøsang is constant and is shown for contrast.
Table I. Certainty computed by different approaches for varying levels of conﬂict.
h0,4i h1, 3i h2,2i h3,1i h4,0i
Our approach 0.54 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.54
Jøsang 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Yu & Singh 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
More speciﬁcally, consider Alice’s example from Section 1. Table I shows the effect of
conﬂict where t = 4. Brieﬂy, Yu and Singh [2002] base uncertainty not on conﬂict, but on
intermediate (neither positive not negative)outcomes. If there is no intermediate value, the
certainty is at its maximum.
Let’s revisit Pete’s example of Section 1. In our approach, Dawn and Ed’s diagnoses
would correspond to two b, d, u triples (where b means “tumor” and d means “not a tu-
mor”):  0.20,0.79,0.01  and  0.20,0.79,0.01 , respectively. Combining these we obtain
the b, d, u triple of  0.21,0.78,0.01 . That is, the weight assigned to a tumor is 0.21 as
opposed to 0.725 by Dempster-Shafer theory—which is unintuitive, because a tumor is
Dawn and Ed’s least likely prediction.
Theorem 2 captures the property that certainty increases with increasing unanimity.
THEOREM 2. The function c(α) is decreasing when 0 < α ≤ 1
2, and increasing when
1
2 ≤ α < 1. Thus c(α) is minimized at α = 1
2.
Proof sketch: The main idea is to show that c′(α) < 0 when α ∈ (0,0.5) and c′(α) >
0 when α ∈ [0.5,1.0). This is accomplished via steps similar to those in the proof of
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Theorem 1. First remove the absolute sign, then differentiate, then prove the derivative is
negative in the interval (0,0.5) and positive in the interval (0.5,1).
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Fig. 3. X-axis: r, number of positive outcomes; Y-axis: s, number of positive outcomes; Z-axis: certainty c(r,s),
the corresponding certainty.
Putting the above results together suggests that the relationship between certainty on
the one hand and positive and negative evidence on the other hand is nontrivial. Figure 3
conﬁrms this intuition by plotting certainty against r and s as a surface. The surface rises
on the left and right corresponding to increasing unanimity of negative and positive evi-
dence, respectively, and falls in the middle as the positive and negative evidence approach
parity. The surface trends upwardgoing from frontto back correspondingto the increasing
evidence at a ﬁxed level of conﬂict.
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Fig. 4. Certainty increases as unanimous evidence increases; the addition of conﬂicting evidence lowers certainty;
X-axis: number of transactions. Y-axis: c certainty.
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It is worth emphasizing that certainty does not necessarily increase even as the evidence
grows. When additional evidence conﬂicts with the previous evidence, a growth in evi-
dence can possibly yield a loss in certainty. This accords with intuition because the arrival
of conﬂicting evidence can shake one’s beliefs, thus lowering one’s certainty.
Figure 4 demonstrates a case where we ﬁrst acquire negative evidence, thereby increas-
ing certainty. Next we acquire positive evidence, which conﬂicts with the previous evi-
dence, thereby lowering certainty. In Figure 4, the ﬁrst ten transactions are all negative;
the next ten transactions are all positive. Certainty grows monotonically with unanimous
evidence and falls as we introduce conﬂicting evidence. Because of the dependence of
certainty on the size of the total body of evidence, it does not fall as sharply as it rises, and
levels off as additional evidence is accrued.
4.3 Bijection Between Evidence and Trust Reports
A major motivation for modeling trust and evidence spaces is that each space facilitates
computations of different kinds. Discounting trust is simple in the trust space whereas
aggregating trust is simple in the evidence space.
Recall that, as Theorem 1 shows, we associate greater certainty with larger bodies of
evidence (assuming conﬂict is ﬁxed). Thus the certainty of trust reports to be combined
clearly matters: we should place additional credence where the certainty is higher (gener-
ally meaning the underlying evidence is stronger). Consequently, we need a way to map
a trust report to its corresponding evidence in such a manner that higher certainty yields
a larger body of evidence. The ability to combine trust reports effectively relies on being
able to map between the evidence and the trust spaces. With such a mapping in hand, to
combine two trust reports, we would simply perform the following steps:
(1) Map trust reports to evidence.
(2) Combine the evidence.
(3) Transform the combined evidence to a trust report.
The following theorem establishes that Z has a unique inverse, Z−1.
THEOREM 3. The transformation Z is a bijection.
Proof sketch: Given  b,d,u  ∈ T, we need (r,s) ∈ E such that Z(r,s) =  b,d,u . As
explained in Section 3.6, α = b
b+d. Thus, we only need to ﬁnd t such that c(t) = 1 − u.
The existence and uniqueness of t is proved by showing that
(1) c(t) is increasing when t > 0 (Theorem 1)
(2) limt→∞ c(t) = 1 (Lemma 11)
(3) limt→0 c(t) = 0 (Lemma 12)
Thus there is a unique t that corresponds to the desired level of certainty.
Lemmas 11 and 12 in the Appendix offer additional details.
4.4 Algorithm and Complexity
Theorem 3 shows the existence of Z−1. However, no closed form is known for Z−1. For
this reason, we develop an iterative, approximate algorithm for computing Z−1. Deﬁni-
tion 5, which provides the basis for Deﬁnition 7, lies at the heart of our algorithm. We
calculate the integral of Deﬁnition 5 via an application of the well-known trapezoidal rule.
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To further improve performance, we cache a matrix of certainty values for different values
of positive and negative evidence.
Notice that α as b
b+d. Further r = tα and s = t(1 − α). But we do not immediately
know t. In essence, no closed form for Z−1 is known because no closed form is known for
its t component. The intuition behind our algorithm for computing t is that after ﬁxing α,
the correct value of t is one that would yield the desired certainty of (1 − u). This works
because, as remarked in the proof sketch for Theorem 3, c(t) ranges between 0 and 1. Fur-
ther, Theorem 1 shows that for ﬁxed α, c(t) is monotonicallyincreasing with t. In general,
t being the size of the body of evidence is not bounded. However, as a practical matter, an
upper bound can be placed on t. Thus, a binary search is an obvious approach. (When no
bound is known, a simple approach would be to (1) guess exponentially increasing values
for t until a valueis foundfor which the desired certainty is exceeded;and then (2) conduct
binary search between that and the previously guessed value.) Since we are dealing with
real numbers, it is necessary to specify ǫ > 0, the desired precision to which the answer is
to be computed. (In our experiments, we set ǫ = 10−4.)
Algorithm 1 calculates Z−1 via binary search on c(t) to a speciﬁed precision, ǫ > 0.
Here tmax > 0 is the maximum size of the body of evidence considered. (Recall that lg
means logarithm to base 2.)
α = b
b+d; c = 1 − u; t1 = 0; t2 = tmax;
while t2 − t1 ≥ ǫ do
t = t1+t2
2 ;
if c(t) < c then t1 = t; else t2 = t;
end
return  tα,t(1 − α) 
Algorithm 1: Calculating  r,s  = Z−1(b,d,u).
THEOREM 4. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is Ω(−lgǫ).
Proof: After the while loop iterates i times, t2 − t1 = tmax2−i. Eventually, t2 − t1 falls
below ǫ, thus terminating the loop. Assume the loop terminates in n iterations. Then,
t2 − t1 = tmax2−n < ǫ ≤ tmax2−n+1. This implies 2n > tmax
ǫ ≥ 2n−1. That is,
n > (lgtmax − lgǫ) ≥ n − 1.
4.5 Empirical Evaluation
Theexperimentalvalidationofthisworkismadedifﬁcultbythelackofestablisheddatasets
and testbeds, especially those that would support more than a scalar representationof trust.
The situation is improving in this regard [Fullam et al. 2005], but current testbeds do not
support exchangingtrust reports of two dimensions (as in  b,d,u  because b+d+u = 1).
We have evaluated this approach on two datasets. The ﬁrst dataset includes ratings
received by ﬁve sellers (of Slumdog Millionaire Soundtracks) on Amazon Marketplace.
Amazon supports integer ratings from 1 to 5. Amazon summarizes the information on
each seller as an average score along with the total number of ratings received. However,
Amazon also makes the raw ratings available—these are what we use. We map the ratings
to evidence  r,s , where r + s = 1. Speciﬁcally, we map 1 to  0.0,1.0 , 2 to  0.25,0.75 ,
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2010.18   Wang & Singh
and so on, increasing r in increments of 0.25 and decreasing s by the same amount to
maintain r + s = 1.
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Fig. 5. Prediction errors based on ratings received by a seller on Amazon using different methods. Here, one
timestep is 25 transactions, errors are the average of the 25 prediction errors, based on ratings in the range [1, 5].
For each seller, we consider the ratings that it received in the order in which it received
them. The idea is that the party who carried out the (i + 1)st transaction with the seller
wouldgenerallyhavehad access to the previousi ratings receivedby that seller. Therefore,
for each i we map the ﬁrst i ratings to a  b,d,u  triple and use this triple to predict the
(i + 1)st rating.
Figure 5 shows the prediction errors that result by applying different methods on the
ratings received by one of the sellers. The Amazon approach refers to treating the average
current rating as the predictor of the next rating. In the other approaches shown, the pre-
diction is the b value computedfrom the ratings up to the present rating. Jøsang’s approach
and our approach calculate b as already discussed.
Table II. Average prediction errors for trustworthiness of ﬁve Amazon sellers based on ratings in the range [1, 5].
Seller A Seller B Seller C Seller D Seller E
Amazon’s approach 0.473 0.287 0.233 0.135 0.502
Jøsang’s approach 0.557 0.333 0.375 0.195 0.530
Our approach 0.388 0.244 0.186 0.122 0.445
Figure 5 shows that our approach yields a lower prediction error than Amazon and
Jøsang’s approaches. Jøsang’s approach is worse than Amazon’s whereas ours is better.
The results for the other sellers are similar, and we omit them for brevity. Table II summa-
rizes the results for all ﬁve sellers and shows that the same pattern holds for them.
We next evaluate our approach with respect to its ability to track a changing behavior
pattern. To develop this test-case while staying in the realm of actual data, we artiﬁcially
constructa seller whoseratingsare aconcatenationoftheratingsobtainedbydifferentsell-
ers. In this way, this seller models a seller who changes his behavior midstream (although,
because all the sellers have high ratings, the change in behavior is not totally arbitrary).
Figure 6 shows the results of applying the above approaches to this artiﬁcial seller. It ﬁnds
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Fig. 6. Prediction errors based on ratings received by an artiﬁcial “multiple personality” seller using different
methods. This seller’s list of ratings is a concatenation of the ratings of the actual sellers. Here, one timestep is
50 transactions and shows the average prediction errors, based on ratings in the range [1, 5].
that the same pattern of results holds as in Figure 5. In Figure 6 too, Jøsang’s approach
yields worse results than Amazon whereas our approach yields superior results. Notice,
however, that data from marketplaces such as Amazon and eBay is inherently positive:
partly it is because it is in the marketplace’s interest to promote higher ratings and partly it
is because only sellers with high ratings survive to have many transactions.
A possible way to understand these results is the following. Amazon calculates the
average rating as the prediction whereas Jøsang incorporates Laplace smoothing (recall
the discussion in Section 3.2). Thus Jøsang ends up with higher error in many cases.
Further, Jøsang’s deﬁnition of certainty ignore conﬂict and thus increases monotonically
with evidence. Thus his predictions are the worst. Our approach takes a more nuanced
approach than Amazon’s but without the pitfalls of Jøsang’s approach, and thus produces
better results.
The second evaluation of the proposed approach is based on its use within trust propa-
gation operators. Recently, Hang et al. [2009] proposed trust propagation operators based
on the approach described in this paper. They evaluated their operators using two net-
workdatasets, namely,FilmTrust (538verticesrepresentingusers; 1,234weighteddirected
edges representing ratings) [Kuter and Golbeck 2007] and the PGP web of trust (39,246
vertices representing users (or rather keys) and 317,979 weighted directed edges repre-
senting the strength of an endorsement) [WoT 2009]. Hang et al. report how the operators
based on our approach perform better than other approaches applied on those datasets. We
lack the space to fully describe their approach here.
5. LITERATURE
A huge amount of research has been conducted on trust. We now review some of the most
relevant literature from our perspective of an evidential approach.
5.1 Literature on Distributed Trust
In general, the works on distributed trust emphasize techniques for propagating trust. In
this sense, they are not closely related to the present approach,which emphasizes evidence
and only indirectly considers propagation. Many of the existing approaches rely on sub-
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jective assessments of trust. Potentially, one could develop variants of these propagation
algorithms that apply on evidence-based trust reports instead of subjective assessments.
However, two challenges would be (1) accommodating  b,d,u  triples instead of scalars;
and (2) conceptually making sense of the propagatedresults in terms of evidence. Hang et
al. [2009], discussed above, address both of these challenges.
Carboneet al. [2003]proposea two-dimensionalrepresentationof trust consisting of (1)
trustworthiness and (2) certainty placed in the trustworthiness. Their proposal is abstract
and lacks a probabilistic interpretation; they do not specify how to calculate certainty or
any properties of it. Carbone et al. do not discuss how the trust originates or relates with
evidence. The level of trustworthiness for them is the extent to which, e.g., the amount
of money loaned, an agent will fully trust another. Weeks [2001] introduces a mathe-
matical framework for distributed trust management. He deﬁnes the semantics of trust
computations as the least ﬁxed point in a lattice. Importantly, Weeks only deals with the
so-calledhardtrustamongagentsthatunderliestraditionalauthorizationandaccess control
approaches. He does not deal with evidential trust, as studied in this paper.
Several approaches understand trust in terms of aggregate properties of graphs, such
as can be described via matrix operations [Guha et al. 2004]. The propagation of trust
corresponds to matrix multiplication. Such aggregate methods can be attractive and have
a history of success when applied to link analysis of web pages. Such link analysis is
inspired by the random browser model. However, it is not immediately apparent why trust
should map to the random browser model, or whether it is even fair to expect trust ratings
to be public the way links on web pages are. A further unintuitive consequence is that
to ensure convergence these approaches split trustworthiness. For example, if Alice trusts
two people but Bob only trusts only one person, Alice’s trustworthiness is split between
two people but Bob’s trustworthiness propagates fully to his sole contact. There is no
conceptual reason for this discrepancy.
Ziegler and Lausen [2004] model trust as energy to be propagated through spreading
activation. They treat trust as a subjective rating based on opinions, not evidence. They
do not justify the energy interpretation conceptually. Ziegler and Lausen’s notion of trust
is global in that each party ends up with an energy level that describes its trustworthiness.
Thus the relational aspect of trust is lost. The above remark about splitting trustworthiness
among multiple parties applies to energy based models as well.
Querciaet al.[2007]relatenodes(correspondingtomobileusers)basedonthesimilarity
of their ratings, and apply a graph-basedlearning technique by which a node may compute
its rating of another node. Their method is similar to collaborative ﬁltering applied by
each node. Crucially, Quercia et al.’s model is based on subjective ratings, not evidence.
However, our approach could potentially be combined with the prediction part of Quercia
et al.’s model. Kuter and Golbeck [2007]propagate trust by combining trust ratings across
all paths from a source to a sink vertex in a graph, along with a conﬁdence measure. The
underlying data are subjective ratings, not evidence.
Schweitzer et al. [2006] apply Jøsang’s representation in ad hoc networks. Their ap-
proach is heuristic and does not explicitly accommodate certainty, unlike Hang et al.
[2009]. Schweitzer et al. enable a participant to withdraw its previous recommendations
of another party.
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5.2 Literature on Trust and Evidence
Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [2000] present an early, ad hoc model for computing trust.
Speciﬁcally, various weights are simply added up without any mathematical justiﬁcation.
Likewise, the term uncertainty is described but without any mathematical foundation.
SierraandDebenham[2007]deﬁneanagentstrategybycombiningthethreedimensions
of utility, information, and semantic views. They justify their, rather complex, framework
based on intuitions and experimental evaluations. Thus it is conceptually plausible, but
lacks an explicit mathematical justiﬁcation, such as in the present approach.
The Regret system combines several aspects of trust, notably the social aspects [Sabater
andSierra 2002]. It involvesa numberofformulas,which are givenintuitive, but notmath-
ematical, justiﬁcation. A lot of other work, e.g., [Huynh et al. 2006], involves heuristics
that combine multiple information sources to judge trust. It would be an interesting direc-
tion to combine a rigorous approach such as ours with the above heuristic approaches to
capture a rich variety of practical criteria well.
Teacy et al. [2005] propose TRAVOS, the Trust and Reputation model for Agent-based
Virtual OrganisationS, which uses a probabilistic treatment of trust. They model trust in
terms of conﬁdence that the expected value lies within a speciﬁed error tolerance. They
study combinations of probability distributions corresponding to evaluations given by dif-
ferent agents, but do not formalizecertainty. Further,Teacy et al.’s approachdoes not yield
a probabilistically valid method for combining trust reports, as supported by our approach.
Despotovicand Aberer[2005]proposemaximumlikelihoodestimationto aggregaterat-
ings, which admits a clear statistical interpretation and reduces the calculation overhead of
propagating and aggregating trust information. However, their model is overly simpliﬁed,
and requires binary rather than real valued ratings. Further, Despotovic and Aberer ignore
theuncertaintyofa rating. Toestimate themaximumlikelihood,eachagentneedstorecord
the trustworthiness of all possible witnesses, thus increasing the complexity. Further, since
each agent only knows a small fraction of all agents, it often cannot compute how much
trust to place in the necessary witnesses.
Reece et al. [2007] consolidate an agent’s direct experience with a providerand trust re-
portsaboutthatproviderreceivedfromothers. Theycalculatea covariancematrixbasedon
the Dirichlet distribution that describes the uncertainty and correlations between different
dimensional probabilities. This matrix can be used to communicate and fuse ratings. The
Dirichlet distribution considers the ratio of positive and negative, but not the total number
of, transactions. The resulting certainty estimates are independent of the total number of
transactions, unlike in our approach. Lastly, Reece et al. neglect the trustworthiness of the
agent who provides the information. in contrast with Wang and Singh [2006].
Halpern and Pucella [2006] treat evidence as an operator that maps prior to posterior
beliefs. Like our certainty function, their conﬁrmation function measures the strength of
the evidence. However,manyconﬁrmationfunctionsareavailable, andit is not clearwhich
one to use. Halpern and Pucella use the log-likelihood ratio, not based on its optimality,
but because it avoids requiring a prior distribution on hypotheses.
Fullam and Barber [2006] support decisions based on agent role (trustee or truster) and
transaction type (fundamental or reputation). They apply Q-learning and explain why the
learning is complicated for reputation. Fullam and Barber [2007] study different sources
of trust information: direct experience, referrals from peers, and reports from third parties.
They propose a dynamical learning technique to identify the best sources of trust. The
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above works disregard uncertainty and do not offer mathematical justiﬁcations.
Liet al.[2008]describeROSSE, asearchengineforgridservicediscoveryandmatching
based on rough set theory. They deﬁne a property as being uncertain when it is used in
some but not all advertisements for services in the same category. Here, uncertainty means
how unlikely a service is to have the property. This is quite different from our meaning
based on outcomes.
Jurca and Faltings [2007] describe a mechanism that uses side payments as incentives
for agents to truthfully report ratings of others. They ignore uncertainty, thus ignoring the
strength of evidence. Overall, though, our approaches are complementary: they obtain in-
dividual ratings; we aggregate the ratings into measures of certainty. Sen and Sajja [2002]
also address deception, modeling agents as following either a low or a high distribution
of quality. They estimate the number of raters (some liars) to query to obtain a desired
likelihood of quality of a service provider, and study thresholds beyond which the number
of liars can disrupt a system. Yu and Singh [2003] show how agents may adaptively detect
deceptive agents. Yolum and Singh [2003] study the emergent graph-theoretic properties
of referral systems. This paper complements such works because it provides an analytical
treatment of trust that they do not provide whereas they address system concerns that this
paper does not study.
5.3 Literature on Information Theory
Shannonentropy [1948]is the best knowninformation-theoreticmeasure of uncertainty. It
is based on a discrete probability distribution p =  p(x)|x ∈ X  over a ﬁnite set X of al-
ternatives (elementary events). Shannon’s formula encodes the number of bits required to
obtain certainty: S(p) = −
 
x∈X p(x)lgp(x). Here S(p) can be viewed as the weighted
average of the conﬂict among the evidentialclaims expressed by p. Jaynes [2003]provides
examples, intuitions, and precise mathematical treatment of entropy. More complex, but
less well-established, deﬁnitions of entropy have been proposed for continuous distribu-
tions as well, e.g., [Smith 2001]. Entropy, however, is not suitable for the present purposes
of modeling evidential trust. Entropy captures (bits of) missing information and ranges
from 0 to ∞. At one level, this disagrees with our intuition that, for the purposes of trust,
we need to model the conﬁdence placed in a probability estimation. Moreover, the above
deﬁnitions cannot be used in measuring the uncertainty of the probability estimation based
on past positive and negative experiences.
6. DISCUSSION
This paper contributes to a mathematical understanding of trust, especially as it underlies
a variety of multiagent applications, especially in social networks and service-oriented
computing. These include social networks understood via referral systems and webs of
trust, in studying which we identiﬁed the need for this research. Such applications require
a natural treatment of composition and discounting in an evidence-based framework.
An evidence-based notion of trust must accommodate the effects of increasing evidence
(for constant conﬂict) and of increasing conﬂict (for constant evidence). Theoretical val-
idation, as provided here, is valuable for a general-purpose mathematical approach. The
main technical insight of this paper is how to manage the duality of trust and evidence
spaces in a manner that provides a rigorous basis for combining trust reports. A beneﬁt is
that an agent who wishes to achievea speciﬁc levelof certaintycan computehow muchev-
idence wouldbe neededat differentlevels of conﬂict. Or, the agent can iterativelycompute
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certainty to see if its certainty is acceptably high.
Potentially, agents could exchange probability distributions based upon the evidence
instead of trust reports. Because of Theorem 3 (on bijection), trust and evidence are equiv-
alent, and the choice between them is arbitrary. However, trust is a valuable concept. In
conceptual terms, trust represents a form of relational capital [Castelfranchi et al. 2006]
among agents. From a practical standpoint, trust summarizes the prospects for an inter-
action that is natural for users thus facilitating requirements elicitation and for explaining
outcomes. Moreover, trust provides a simple means of facilitating interoperation without
requiring that the implementations agree on their internal representations.
6.1 Conclusions
We target applications that involve parties acquiring evidence in order to make reasoned
judgments about interacting with others. Capturing certainty is thus crucial. As a practical
matter, it is inevitable that there be conﬂicts in the evidence, yet previous approaches dis-
regard conﬂict in how they calculate certainty. Thus our results are a signiﬁcant advance
even though our approach begins from the same PCDF framework as applied by Jøsang in
his treatment of trust. We now summarize our technical contributions.
—This paper offers a theoretical development of trust wherein (1) certainty increases as
conﬂict in the evidence decreases and (2) for a ﬁxed level of conﬂict, certainty increases
as the amount of evidence increases.
—This paper establishes a bijection between evidence and trust and provides an efﬁcient
algorithm for computing this bijection.
6.2 Directions
This work opens up some important directions for future work. First, how would trust
evolve with the passage of time, as more evidence is obtained? We might aggregate ev-
idence incrementally and potentially discount evidence by its age. Crucially, because of
the bijection established above, the historical evidence can be summarized in a belief-
disbelief-uncertainty triple. New evidence can then be readily incorporated. Second, prior
probability distributions (other than uniform, as above) such as the Gaussian distribution
may be useful in different settings. We conjecture that certainty deﬁned on other well-
behaved probability distributions would support the properties with respect to evidence
and conﬂict as above. Third, an important technical challenge is to extend the above work
from binary to multivalued events. Such an extension would enable us to handle a larger
variety of interactions among people and services. Fourth, we can imagine new models
that encompass all the challenging aspects of the beta model, which can analyze the model
and provide with algorithms for computing the various probabilities in this model. We are
considering a simple approach in which multivalued events are digitized, by treating each
as a set of binary events.
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A. PROOFS OF THEOREMS AND AUXILIARY LEMMAS
LEMMA 5. fr,s(x) is increasing when x ∈ [0, r
r+s) and decreasing when x ∈ ( r
r+s,1]
fr,s(x) is maximized at x = r
r+s.
Proof: To show monotonicity, it is adequate to assume r and s are integers and r + s > 0.
The derivative
dfr,s(x)
dx =
x
r−1(1−x)
s−1
  1
0 xr(1−x)sdx(r(1 − x) − sx)
=
x
r−1(1−x)
s−1
  1
0 xr(1−x)sdx(r − (r + s)x)
Since r − (r + s)x > 0 when x ∈ [0, r
r+s) and r − (r + s)x < 0 when x ∈ ( r
r+s,1], we
have
dfr,s(x)
dx > 0 when x ∈ [0, r
r+s) and
dfr,s(x)
dx < 0 when x ∈ ( r
r+s,1]. Then fr,s(x)
is increasing when x ∈ [0, r
r+s) and fr,s(x) is decreasing when x ∈ ( r
r+s,1] fr,s(x) has
maximum at x = r
r+s.
The motivation behind Lemma 6 is, in essence, to remove the absolute value function
that occurs in the deﬁnition of certainty. Doing so enables differentiation.
LEMMA 6. Given A and B deﬁned by fr,s(A) = fr,s(B) = 1, 0 < A < r
r+s < B <
1, we have cf =
  B
A (fr,s(x) − 1)dx
Proof: As in Deﬁnition 2, r + s > 0 throughout this paper. By Lemma 5, fr,s(x) is
strictly increasing for x ∈ [0, r
r+s), strictly decreasing for x ∈ ( r
r+s,1] and maximized
at x = r
r+s. Since the average of fr,s(x) in [0,1] is 1.0, we have that fr,s( r
r+s) > 1.0.
Since fr,s(0) = fr,s(1) = 0, there are A and B such that fr,s(A) = fr,s(B) = 1 and
0 < A < r
r+s < B < 1
From Lemma 5, we have fr,s(x) < 1 when x ∈ [0,A) or x ∈ (B,1] and fr,s(x) > 1 when
x ∈ (A,B). By Deﬁnition 3, we have
  1
0 (fr,s(x) − 1)dx = 0.
Therefore,
  A
0 (fr,s(x) − 1)dx +
  1
B (fr,s(x) − 1)dx +
  B
A (fr,s(x) − 1)dx = 0
and
  A
0 (1 − fr,s(x))dx +
  1
B (1 − fr,s(x))dx
=
  B
A (fr,s(x) − 1)dx.
Thus
  1
0 |fr,s(x)−1|dx =
  A
0 1 − (fr,s(x))dx+
  1
B (1 − fr,s(x))dx+
  B
A (fr,s(x) − 1)dx
and 1
2
  1
0 |fr,s(x) − 1|dx =
  B
A (fr,s(x) − 1)dx.
LEMMA 7.
  1
0
xr(1 − x)sdx =
1
r + s + 1
r  
i=1
i
r + s + 1 − i
Proof: We use integration by parts.   1
0 xr(1 − x)sdx =
  1
0 xrd( −1
s+1(1 − x)s+1)
= −
x
r(1−x)
s+1
s+1 |1
0 + r
s+1
  1
0 xr−1(1 − x)s+1dx
= r
s+1
  1
0 xr−1(1 − x)s+1dx
=    
=
r (r−1)   1
(r+s) (r+s−1)   (s+1)
  1
0 (1 − x)r+sdx
= 1
r+s+1
r  
i=1
i
r+s+1−i.
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In order to simplify the notation in the proofs below, we replace the term t + 2 by e.
Thus r = αe − 1 and s = (1 − α)e − 1, c(e) = c(αe − 1,(1 − α)e − 1). Without loss
of generality, we assume r = αe − 1 and s = (1 − α)e − 1 are integers in the following
proofs.
LEMMA 8.
lim
r→∞
r
   
 
 
r  
i=1
i
αr + r + 1 − i
=
αα
(1 + α)α+1 (1)
Where r is a positive integer.
Proof: This lemma is used in the next lemma, to show that the right side of an equation
approaches a constant, where the equation has duplicated roots, and then the two roots of
the equation approach that duplicated root in the limit.
limr→∞
1
r ln
r  
i=1
i
αr+r+1−i
= limr→∞
1
r ln(
r  
i=1
i
r  
i=1
1
αr+r+1−i)
= limr→∞
1
r ln(
r  
i=1
i
r  
i=1
1
αr+i)
= limr→∞
1
r
i=r  
i=1
ln i
αr+i
= limr→∞
1
r
i=r  
i=1
ln
i
r
α+ i
r
=
  1
0 ln x
α+xdx
= ln α
α
(1+α)α+1
Therefore,
limr→∞
r
 
r  
i=1
i
αr+r+1−i = α
α
(1+α)α+1.
LEMMA 9.
lim
r→∞
A(r) = lim
r→∞
B(r) =
1
1 + α
(2)
Where r is a positive integer.
Proof: The idea is to show that A(r) and B(r) are two roots of an equation g(x) = β(r).
If limr→∞ β(r) = β and the equation g(x) = β has duplicated roots of α, then we have
limr→∞ A(r) = limr→∞ B(r) = α
By Lemma 6, A(r) and B(r) are two roots for the equation
x(1 − x)α =
r
   1
0 xr(1 − x)αrdx
since
limr→∞
r
   1
0 xr(1 − x)αrdx
= limr→∞
r
 
1
αr+r+1
r  
i=1
i
αr+r+1−i (by Lemma 7)
= α
α
(1+α)α+1 (by Lemma 8)
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems, Vol. 5, No. 3, September 2010.28   Wang & Singh
= 1
1+α(1 − 1
1+α)α
since x(1 − x)α achieves its maximum at x = 1
1+α, and x = 1
1+α is the only root for the
equation
x(1 − x)α = 1
1+α(1 − 1
1+α)α
Therefore,
limr→∞ A(r) = limr→∞ B(r) = 1
1+α.
Proof of Theorem 1 c(r) is increasing where r > 0 c′(r) = d
dr
  B(r)
A(r) (
(x
r(1−x)
αr
  1
0 yr(1−y)αrdy −
1)dx
= B′(r)(
B
r(r)(1−B(r))
αr
  1
0 (yr(1−y)αrdy − 1)
−A′(r)(
A
r(r)(1−A(r))
αr
  1
0 (yr(1−y)αrdy − 1)
+
  B(r)
A(r)
d
dr(
(x
r(1−x)
αr
  1
0 yr(1−y)αrdy − 1)dx
=
  B(r)
A(r)
d
dr
(x
r(1−x)
αr
  1
0 yr(1−y)αrdydx
= 1
d2(
  B(r)
A(r)
d
dr(xr(1 − x)αr)
  1
0 yr(1 − y)αrdy
−
  B(r)
A(r) (xr(1 − x)αr) d
dr
  1
0 yr(1 − y)αrdy)
= 1
d2(
  B(r)
A(r) (xr(1 − x)αr)ln(x(1 − x)α)
  1
0 yr(1 − y)αrdy
−
  B(r)
A(r) (xr(1 − x)αr)
  1
0 yr(1 − y)αr ln(y(1 − y)α)dy)
= 1
d2
  1
0
  B(r)
A(r) xr(1 − x)αryr(1 − y)αr ln
x(1−x)
α
y(1−y)αdxdy
where d =
  1
0 yr(1 − y)αrdy. According to Lemma 5 xr(1 − x)αr > yr(1 − y)αr when
x ∈ [A(r),B(r)] and y ∈ (0,A(r)] ∪ [B(r),1) so we have
  A(r)
0
  B(r)
A(r) xr(1 − x)αryr(1 − y)αr ln
x(1−x)
α
y(1−y)αdxdy > 0
and   1
B(r)
  B(r)
A(r) xr(1 − x)αryr(1 − y)αr ln
x(1−x)
α
y(1−y)αdxdy > 0
since   B(r)
A(r)
  B(r)
A(r) xr(1 − x)αryr(1 − y)αr ln
x(1−x)
α
y(1−y)αdxdy = 0
we have c′(r) > 0, so c(r) is increasing when r > 0.
LEMMA 10. DeﬁneL(r) = 1   1
0 f(x,r)dx
  A(r)
0 f(x,r)dx andR(r) = 1   1
0 f(x,r)dx
  1
B(r) f(x,r)dx.
Where
f(x,r) = xr(1 − x)αr Then
limr→∞ L(r) = 0 and limr→∞ R(r) = 0
Proof: We only need to show that limr→∞ L(r) = 0. Since limr→∞ R(r) = 0 can be
proved similarly. The idea is to show that L(r) is the remainder of the Taylor expansion of
(A + 1 − A)αr+r
  A
0 xr(1 − x)αrdx
=
  A
0 xrd( −1
αr+1(1 − x)αr+1)
= −1
αr+1xr(1 − x)αr+1|A
0 + r
αr+1
  A
0 xr−1(1 − x)αr+1dx
= r
αr+1
  A
0 xr−1(1 − x)αr+1dx − 1
αr+1Ar(1 − A)αr+1
=    
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= 1
αr+r+1
r  
i=1
i
αr+i(1 − (1 − A)αr+r+1)
−
r  
i=1
r  
j=i
j
αr+r+1−j
A
i
i (1 − A)αr+r+1−i
So
L(r) = 1   1
0 xr(1−x)αrdx
  A
0 xr(1 − x)αrdx
= (αr + r + 1)
r  
i=1
αr+r+1−i
i
  A
0 xr(1 − x)αrdx
= 1 − (1 − A)αr+r+1
−(αr + r + 1)
r  
i=1

 αr + r
i − 1

A
i
i (1 − A)αr+r+1−i
= (αr + r + 1)(
  A
0 (x + 1 − A)αr+rdx
−
r  
i=1
  A
0

 αr + r
i − 1

xi−1(1 − A)αr+r+1−idx)
where

 αr + r
k

 =
k  
i=1
αr+r+1−i
i for any positive integer k. Since
(x + 1 − A)αr+r =
∞  
i=0

 αr + r
i

xi(1 − A)αr+r−i
so we have
L(r) = (αr + r + 1)
∞  
i=r
  A
0

 αr + r
i

xi(1 − A)αr+r−idx
= (αr + r + 1)
∞  
i=r

 αr + r
i

A
i+1
i+1 (1 − A)αr+r−i
≤ αr+r+1
r A
∞  
i=r

 αr + r
i

Ai(1 − A)αr+r−i
= αr+r+1
r A((A + 1 − A)αr+r −
r−1  
i=0

 αr + r
i

Ai(1 − A)αr+r−i)
since
r−1  
i=0

 αr + r
i

Ai(1 − A)αr+r−i is the Taylor expansion of (A + 1 − A)αr+r = 1, so
lim
r→∞
1 −
r−1  
i=0

 αr + r
i

Ai(1 − A)αr+r−i = 0
and by Lemma 9 lim
r→∞
αr+r+1
r A = 1. Therefore,
limr→∞ L(r) = 0 and similarly limr→∞ R(r) = 0.
LEMMA 11. limr→∞ c(r) = 1
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Proof: Let f =
x
r(1−x)
αr
  1
0 xr(1−x)αrdx. Then we have
c(x) =
  1
0 f(x)dx − L(x) − R(x) − (B − A)
since
  1
0 f(x)dx = 1,limr→∞ B−A = 0(byLemma9)andlimr→∞ L(r) = limr→∞ R(r) =
0 (by Lemma 10). So
limr→∞ c(r) = 1
LEMMA 12. limr→0 c(r) = 0.
Proof: We only give a sketch of the proof. Let f(x) ≤ M when r < 1. For ∀ǫ > 0,
let δ = ǫ
2(M+1), since
x
r(1−x)
αr
  1
0 xr(1−x)αrdx approaches to 1 uniformly in the interval [δ,1 − δ],
when r → 0. So ∃ r0 > 0 such that,
|f(x) − 1| < ǫ when r < r0,x ∈ [δ,1 − δ]. So when r < r0,
c(r) = 1
2
  1
0 |f(x) − 1|dx
= 1
2(
  δ
0 |f(x) − 1|dx +
  1−δ
δ |f(x) − 1|dx
  1
1−δ |f(x) − 1|dx)
< 1
2((M + 1)δ + ǫ + (M + 1)δ) = ǫ. Hence we have lim
r→0
c(r) = 0.
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